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FROM "PREFERRED POSITION" TO "POOR
RELATION": HISTORY, WILKIE V. ROBBINS, AND THE
STATUS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE
MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared for the Supreme Court: "We see no
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill
of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the
status of a poor relation ....... The decision in which this declaration was made,
Dolan v. City of Tigard, set a high bar for government actions that put property
owners to the difficult choice between freely dedicating portions of their land to the
public or foregoing needed regulatory approval for a proposed land use.a In doing
so, the Court suggested that the government could not simply force a property
owner to relinquish her constitutional right to receive just compensation in
exchange for the conferral of discretionary governmental benefits.3 "A strong public
desire to improve the public condition," the Court announced, "[will not] warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."4
A few months before the Court released its decision in Dolan, Wyoming rancher
George Nelson conveyed an easement across his ranch to the Federal Bureau of
Land Management (BLM).' In exchange for the easement, Nelson received a right-
of-way across a nearby portion of federally-owned property.6 The BLM, however,
neglected to record its easement, a mistake that proved particularly troublesome
when Nelson sold the ranch to Frank Robbins two months later.7 Robbins had no
knowledge of the easement, and under Wyoming law, the failure to record meant
that he took the ranch free and clear of the government's interest.8 Upon discovering
that the easement had been extinguished, a BLM employee telephoned Robbins and
demanded that he re-convey the easement. 9 Robbins rejected this demand, but he
indicated his willingness to negotiate with the BLM over the granting of a new
easement, provided some sort of compensation was in the offing.'0 The BLM
employee responded by telling Robbins that "the Federal Government does not
* Assistant Professor of Law, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank Lance P.
McMillian, Scott W. Sigman, and Melanie D. Wilson for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article,
as well as Greg Frayser and Daniel Stafford for their research assistance.
1. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
2. See id. at 391 (establishing "rough proportionality" test for regulatory exactions).
3. See id. at 385.
4. See id. at 396 (quoting Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
5. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593 (2007).
6. Id.
7. See id.; see also id. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2593.
9. Id.
10. See id.
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negotiate"' and "[this [i.e., granting the easement] is what you're going to do."12
Robbins again refused, at which point the BLM (at least according to Robbins's
allegations) "mounted a seven-year campaign of relentless harassment and
intimidation to force Robbins to give in."
13
This campaign consisted of BLM officials intentionally trespassing across
Robbins's land, taking adverse administrative actions against him, provoking a
violent altercation between Robbins and a neighboring landowner, pressuring other
agencies to impound his cattle, falsely charging him with criminal activity, and
harassing his customers (including one occasion where several female guests were
videotaped while attempting to relieve themselves). 4 The cumulative effect of these
actions was a reduction in business for the ranch of over 80 percent, as well as
"hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and attorney's fees."' 5 As a result,
Robbins filed suit for damages under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,16 alleging (among other things) that the
BLM officials unconstitutionally retaliated against him for exercising his Fifth
Amendment right to refuse an uncompensated taking of his property.' 7
Thus began a collision course, in 1994, between these two seemingly unrelated
events-the Court's pronouncements in Dolan and the BLM's campaign to bully
a landowner into giving it an uncompensated easement. Thirteen years later, the
confrontation was concluded, and the property rights embodied in the Takings
Clause were declared the loser. Although both the district court and the court of
appeals agreed that Robbins's retaliation claim could go forward, 8 in Wilkie v.
Robbins, a seven-member majority of the Supreme Court rejected that claim,
holding that it was not cognizable under the judicially-created Bivens remedy.' 9
There are many interesting points about Wilkie, from its potential effect on
constitutional tort litigation2" to the alignment of the Justices with regard to
Robbins's claim.2' One of the most significant features of Wilkie, however, is what
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 2594-96; id. at 2608-11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2596.
18. Id. at 2596-97 (discussing procedural history).
19. See id. at 2604-05.
20. See, e.g., John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REv. 723,731
(2008) (discussing whether Wilkie endorses view that state remedies foreclose availability of Bivens remedy);
Laurence H. Tribe, Death By a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins,
2007 CATOSUP. C-r. REV. 23,26 (2007) (indicating that, after Wilkie, "the Bivens doctrine...is on life support with
little prospect of recovery").
21. The majority opinion rejecting the claims of the property owner was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, whom several commentators have suggested form the Court's conservative
bloc. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rookie Year of the Roberts Court & a Look Ahead: Civil Rights, 34 PEPP.
L. REV. 535,536 (2007) (identifying these Justices as "very conservative"); Charles Lane, Narrow Victories Move
Roberts Court to Right, WASH. POST, June 29, 2007, at A4 (describing these Justices as "the four most
conservative"). One would suspect that these Justices would be more sympathetic to property rights, given that the
use of the Takings Clause to protect private property has been described as "a favorite conservative cause." See
David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEo. L.J. 1427, 1434 (2006). In dissent were Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens, who have been described as "liberals generally considered unsympathetic to property
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it says about the status of property rights in the current understanding of
constitutional liberties. The claim advanced by Robbins-that he should not be
forced to choose between his constitutional right to just compensation and freedom
from government harassment-seems very close to the choice-based dilemma
cautioned against in Dolan.22 Indeed, as described by Professor Tribe (who
represented Robbins), that claim "fits comfortably within the Supreme Court's
longstanding and widely applied hostility toward government retaliation against the
exercise of constitutional rights."23 The Wilkie majority overlooked these
similarities, however, and described the BLM's actions as little more than hard
bargaining with an adjacent landowner.24 Additionally, the majority openly worried
that allowing the claim to go forward would release the floodgates to property rights
litigation,25 an argument the Court previously has rejected in the context of other
constitutional rights.26 From these statements, it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that, despite its contrary pronouncements in Dolan, the Court views the rights at
issue in Wilkie-that is, those property rights embodied in the Takings Clause-as
less deserving of protection than other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. And
this conclusion seems all the more inescapable given the increasing vigor with
which the federal courts have enforced nonproperty-related rights throughout the
last century. 27 As suggested by Ilya Somin, Wilkie indicates that constitutional
property rights enjoy a "second-class status. ''28
Juxtaposed against Wilkie and its implications are the high regard for property
rights generally, and the just compensation principle specifically, held by early
American statesmen and jurists. A study of the ideas underlying the Takings Clause,
and the implementation of those ideas by the courts, reveals a stark contrast to the
attitude expressed by the Wilkie majority. Indeed, far from being any type of "poor
relation," the rights embodied in the Takings Clause "occupied the 'preferred
position' in America's pantheon of constitutional values. 29
This article explores these differences by contrasting the status of property rights
during the formative period of American constitutionalism with the status of those
rights as reflected in Wilkie. To that end, this article seeks to develop the ideas
underlying the Takings Clause and to evaluate what Wilkie suggests about the
continued vitality of those ideas. Part II of this article discusses the ideas embodied
in the Takings Clause by looking at how those ideas were developed and
owners." See llya Somin, Put Out to Pasture, LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 2007.
22. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (stating that doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions" prohibits government from requiring person to give up constitutional right to receive just compensation
in exchange for discretionary governmental benefits).
23. See Tribe, supra note 20, at 35-36 (discussing anti-retaliation principle in context of free speech, right
against self-incrimination, right to jury trial, right of access to federal courts, and right to interstate travel).
24. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2602.
25. See id. at 2604.
26. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
27. See generally Daniel F. Piar, A Welfare State of Civil Rights: The Triumph of the Therapeutic in
American Constitutional Law, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 649,649-52 (2008) (discussing growth of judicially-
enforceable civil rights and suggesting possible explanations for this growth).
28. Somin, supra note 21.
29. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 57 (1986).
Winter 2009]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
implemented by the early American legal culture. Part Ifi then contrasts these ideas
with the Court's decision in Wilkie and what that decision suggests about the
current (and future) status of constitutional property rights. Part IV offers
concluding remarks.
II. "PREFERRED POSITION"-PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EARLY AMERICA
Any discussion of the ideas embodied in the Takings Clause must initially
confront the limited historical record concerning that Clause. Indeed, the legislative
history regarding the proposal and ratification of the Takings Clause "is notoriously
sparse."3 So far as we know, no delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1787
made any mention of the need for protecting against the government's taking
power.3" Similarly, although the state ratifying conventions proposed over eighty
different amendments to be incorporated into the Bill of Rights, not a single request
was made for the Takings Clause or any equivalent measure.32 In light of these
facts, one scholar famously has wondered "how [the Clause] got into our
constitutions at all. 33
What became the Takings Clause seems entirely to have been the product of
James Madison, who included a just-compensation provision (in slightly different
form) among the draft Bill of Rights he offered in a speech before the House of
Representatives on June 8, 1789."4 But Madison left no documentary evidence to
explain his reasons for the provision, nor did the provision produce any meaningful
discussion in Congress or the state legislatures. 35 For this reason, any discussion of
the ideas underlying the Takings Clause cannot simply focus on the events
surrounding the ratification of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, a broader evaluation
is necessary.
This article attempts that evaluation by looking at how those ideas were
developed and implemented by the legal culture-that is, by early American
lawyers, legislators, and judges. In addressing the perspectives of this culture, the
discussion will include aspects of the legal tradition inherited by early Americans
from their English and colonial forebears, as well as from the practical experiences
and political philosophies that led to the Constitution itself. A primary focus of the
30. See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1132 (2000).
31. See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship
Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 282 (1988).
32. See id. at 282-83; see also DAVID A. DANA& THOMAS W. MERRIL., PROPERTY: TAKINGS 9-10 (2002);
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandings of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 782, 834 (1995).
33. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 595 (1972).
34. 1 ANNALSOFCONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also Hart, supra note 30, at 1132 (suggesting
that "Madison generated the Takings Clause on his own"). Historian Lance Banning has observed that the
amendments offered by Madison "represented his distinctive wishes more completely than is frequently suggested
by repeated, casual references to his extraction from the propositions of the state conventions only those that he
considered safe." LANCE BANNING, SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC 289 (1995). Given the complete inattention paid to the eminent-domain orjust-compensation
issues by the state ratifying conventions, this seems especially plausible with regard to the Takings Clause.
35. See McConnell, supra note 31, at 283.
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evaluation, however, will be the manner in which these ideas were expounded by
the courts.
There are several reasons to concentrate attention on judicial decisions. First,
evidence exists that the Takings Clause was meant to be judicially enforceable,36
and early judicial treatment of the Clause thus seems to be a natural topic of inquiry.
Second, the legal controversies occurring during the first generation after
ratification greatly influenced the nation's earliest constitutional understandings.37
The "malleable nature of the young republic" during this period, as well as the
recognition of its leaders "that this first generation of the nineteenth
century... would be the one to shape that nature,"38 gives these early judicial
pronouncements a certain prominence in American constitutional thought. Finally,
judicial opinions often reveal much about the larger intellectual and cultural
attitudes prevailing at any point in time. As my colleague Daniel F. Piar has
explained, there is "considerable interplay" between the legal culture and the
society to which it is attached.39 Thus, judicial decisions frequently reflect and find
their authority in the accepted values of the day.4° Accordingly, a study of the era's
judicial opinions is relevant to understanding the perspectives held by society more
generally.
Unfortunately, there is little direct application of the Takings Clause by the
courts of this era for two reasons. First, in Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court
held that the Clause applied only to the federal government, and not to the states.4 '
Second, until the late nineteenth century, the federal government normally had the
states condemn on its behalf or else paid compensation by private-bill legislation.42
As such, there was little opportunity to develop a body of thorough precedent
regarding the Takings Clause. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern how the legal
culture understood the ideas and purposes of the Takings Clause by reviewing state
court decisions addressing issues of eminent domain, as well as similar decisions
from the federal courts sitting in diversity. Likewise, given the intellectual linkage
36. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings
Thesis "Goes Too Far", 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 216-17 (1999); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding
of the Taking Clause Is Neither WeakNor Obtuse, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1630, 1659-61, 1661 n. 161 (1988); Treanor,
supra note 32, at 794 n.69.
37. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (settling doctrine of judicial
review of legislative acts for conformity to Constitution).
38. See WImLIAM F. SwINDLER, THE CONSTT ON AND CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL 21 (1978).
39. See Daniel F. Piar, Majority Rights, Minority Freedoms: Protestant Culture, Personal Autonomy, and
Civil Liberties in Nineteenth-Century America, 14 WM. & MARY BI.L RTS. J. 987, 992 (2006). For examples of
how this interplay works, see id. at 1008-22 (discussing how nineteenth-century cultural values influenced that
era's understanding of the First Amendment).
40. For a similar suggestion more contemporary to the opinions included in the following discussion, see
ALEXIS DE TocQuEvuLE, DEMOCRAcY 1N AMERICA 115 (Bruce Frohnen ed., Regnery Publishing 2002) (1889)
(indicating that power of Supreme Court "is clothed in the authority of public opinion," without which it "would
be impotent").
41. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,250-51 (1833). The Takings Clause now applies to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,827 (1987). Exactly
when "incorporation" of the Clause took place is a matter of some debate. See Treanor, supra note 31, at 860 n.369
(suggesting as possibilities Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), and Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894)).
42. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549,
1605-06 (2003); Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 559 n.18.
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between the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause,43 decisions dealing with the
latter can shed light on attitudes about the former. Finally, judicial statements about
property rights more generally can offer worthwhile information inasmuch as they
demonstrate the high value that the legal culture placed on such rights.
With this background in mind, a review of early American legal culture suggests
at least three major characteristics concerning property rights: (1) private property
enjoyed a central place in the legal culture and its perspectives on the proper
relationship between individuals and the government; (2) the just compensation
principle formed an integral part of the legal culture's conception that private
property should be protected from undue governmental interference; and (3) the
legal culture looked increasingly to the judiciary, rather than the political branches,
as the ultimate guardian of property rights.
A. The Centrality of Property
Many scholars have observed that protecting private property was one of the
driving forces underlying the constitutional system created in 1787." By the time
of the Constitutional Convention, Americans had seen firsthand the threats to
property interests that could be occasioned by unchecked republican governments.
During the Revolution and Confederation era, the state and national legislatures had
engaged in several acts injurious to property, including the confiscation and
redistribution of estates held by Loyalists and British subjects,45 the expropriation
of goods and services without payment,' and the upsetting of commercial
relationships through paper money schemes and debtor-relief legislation.47 In light
of this experience, there was widespread agreement among the Convention
delegates that the chief goal of any new government was the protection of liberty
and property," which they understood as inextricably linked.49 At least three
delegates placed the protection of property before liberty as the chief end of
political society. Gouverneur Morris pronounced property to be "the main object
of Society" and indicated that individuals gave up the state of nature solely "for the
43. The Contracts Clause was patterned after a provision in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which also
included just compensation language. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIEs 395 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1978). Early American courts tended to view the Contracts Clause and the
Takings Clause as dealing with related concepts. See Siegel, supra note 29, at 86-87 (noting that "contract clause
jurisprudence was shaped by the paradigm of takings clause adjudication").
44. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2000); William W. Fisher, Il Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection ofPrivate
Property: 1760-1860,39 EMORY L.J. 65, 100 (1990); Gold, supra note 36, at 194-96; McConnell, supra note 31,
at 270.
45. See FORREsr MCDoNALD, NOvuS ORDO SECLORUM 90-93 (1985); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 201 (1796) (referring to legislation vesting in the state real and personal property belonging to British
subjects); Chews v. Sparks, I N.J.L. 56 (1791) (confiscation of landed estate previously held by supposed traitor).
46. See, e.g., Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. 1788) (removal and destruction of private
goods for military purposes).
47. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 154-55; 1 ALFREDH. KELLY, ETAL.,THEAMERICANCONTUON
82-84 (7th ed. 1991); Fisher, supra note 44, at 102.
48. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 3-4.
49. James W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation ": The Evolution of Unenumerated
Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 917 (2006).
50. MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 3-4 (identifying Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, John Rutledge of
South Carolina, and Rufus King of Massachusetts).
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sake of property which could only be secured by the restraints of regular
Government."'51 James Madison expressed a similar sentiment: "Government is
instituted to protect property of every sort .... This being the end of government, that
alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his
own. ''52 In short, "[t]he protection of private property was a nearly unanimous
intention among the founding generation. 53
It would be a mistake, however, to view this emphasis on property as a new
development in American thought. To the contrary, property (primarily in the form
of landed interests) played a dominant role in the legal tradition inherited by the
Founders from their English and colonial forebears.54 Sir William Blackstone
included "the right of private property" among the core rights of Englishmen,
alongside "the right of personal security" and "the right of personal liberty."55
Blackstone described this right of private property as consisting of "the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of all [an individual's] acquisitions, without any control
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."56 The protection of these property
rights, along with those of security and liberty, formed "the principal aim of
society," such "that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and
regulate these absolute rights of individuals."57
These sentiments were echoed in the leading political philosophies of the
Revolution and Confederation periods, as well. Particularly influential were the
theories articulated a century before by English philosopher John Locke, 58 which
51. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
52. James Madison, Property (1792), reprinted in I THEFOUNDERS' CONSTrUTION 598 (Philip B. Kurand
& Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Although Madison wrote these words after ratification, there is little question that
protecting property was among his chief considerations at the time of the Convention. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 147 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (recording Madison as stating that "[t]he primary
objects of civil society are the security of property and public safety"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) ("The protection of these faculties, [from
which the rights of property originate,] is the first object of government."); Jack Rakove, The Madisonian Moment,
55 U. CI. L. REV. 473, 483 (1988) ("[T]here can be no doubt that concern with the protection of property lay at
the very center of Madison's anxieties about republican government.").
53. McConnell, supra note 31, at 270. This intention was shared by Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike.
See Fisher, supra note 44, at 100.
54. See LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN,A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 52 (1973) (describing English land law
as "the heart of the royal common law"); id. at 56 ("In the colonies, land was hardly of less importance than in
England.").
55. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 125. The importance of Blackstone's Commentaries
to early American lawyers has been noted by several scholars. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 98 ("Blackstone
was widely used by ordinary lawyers as a shortcut to the law...."); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 567 (2007) (noting that Blackstone's Commentaries "grounded the legal
education of Founding-era Americans").
56. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at * 134.
57. Id. at* 120.
58. Although Locke's importance has at times been overstated, his influence on the founding generation,
especially concerning the relationship between government and property, is unmistakable. See, e.g., DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12 (2d ed. 2005) (describing Locke's
theories as "[plerhaps the most thorough discussion of natural rights available to the founding generation");
MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 7 (noting that, at the Constitutional Convention, "[t]he contract and natural-rights
theories of John Locke were repeatedly iterated without reference to their source"); Ely, supra note 49, at 930
(stating that "Locke had an enormous impact on constitutional thought"); Richard A Epstein, History Lean: The
Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591,593 (1995) ("No
amount of historical roaming or romanticizing about the Founding can negate the Lockean influence on the Takings
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received heightened attention in America because of their significance to the idea
and goal of political independence." According to Locke, all persons are initially
in a state of nature-that is, they are lacking organized political society.' In this
natural state, people enjoy the freedom to decide for themselves how to arrange
their affairs, including the use and disposition of their possessions and persons.6'
So long as individuals remain in the state of nature, however, this freedom lacks
stability inasmuch as every individual enjoys the exact same freedom, with none
having authority to settle disputes or regulate conduct for the mutual benefit of all.62
Accordingly, the rights enjoyed in the state of nature are to some degree indefinite
because they are "constantly exposed to the Invasion of others." 63 To obtain greater
security for these rights, people unite together "for the mutual Preservation of their
Lives, Liberties and Estates," which Locke calls "by the general Name, Property."'
Thus, for Locke, as with Blackstone, the primary purpose for which individuals
create and submit to formal government "is the Preservation of their Property."65
Locke viewed government largely as a mechanism for protecting individual
interests; as such, government necessarily operates under certain natural limitations.
Among these limitations is the inability to "take from any Man any part of his
Property without his own consent." When a government violates these
restrictions, thus acting contrary to the ends for which it was established, it ceases
to be legitimate, and the people possess the right to dissolve their ties with such a
government and create a new one. 67 This right of revolution was appealing to
Americans for obvious reasons: Locke gave American patriots a clear rationale for
severing their political ties with Britain, and property rights played a distinct role
in that rationale.
This is not to say that all Americans shared a single, consensual political
philosophy. To the contrary, scholars have identified a variety of viewpoints at work
during the founding era,68 with varying ideas about what constitutes property, what
types of property should be protected, and to what extent that protection should be
afforded.69 Nonetheless, despite the differences in these political outlooks, there
seems to have been fairly broad agreement with the notion that one of the primary
goals of government was to secure individuals in their property.7"
Clause."); Gold, supra note 36, at 217 (describing Locke as "one of the most influential liberal thinkers on property
rights during the late eighteenth century in America").
59. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 60.
60. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 269, 350.
63. See id. at 350.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 350-51.
66. See id. 360.
67. Seeid. 412-14.
68. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 57-96; Fisher, supra note 44, at 71-75. For reviews of the
shifting patterns in historical scholarship relating to early American political thought, as well as the dominant
scholars associated with each movement, see id. at 67-71 and Treanor, supra note 32, at 819-24.
69. See Fisher, supra note 44, at 95 n.121, 98-99.
70. See id. at 95-99 (explaining that all major viewpoints during the Founding era, to varying degrees,
showed theoretical hostility to uncompensated takings of private property).
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One of the more important of these alternative philosophical traditions-
republicanism-proves illustrative.71 In contrast to Lockean liberalism and its
emphasis on individual rights, republicanism promoted the idea that good
government depended on public virtue, which in turn required the subordination of
one's personal interests to the needs of the commonwealth.72 This meant that
individual citizens might at times be called upon to submit their property rights to
the common good, a concept seemingly at odds with the Lockean notion that
government could not take individual property without the consent of its owner. But
there was less disagreement than appears at first blush. Locke's understanding of
consent included not only the individual agreement of the owner himself, but also
the agreement of his elected representatives (who essentially could consent on his
behalf).73 Thus, Locke supported the idea that individual interests might yield to the
public good when a popularly elected legislature determined such was necessary.
More importantly, republicanism supported the Lockean understanding of the
significance of private property, valuing property ownership (especially with regard
to land) as essential to fostering the virtue needed for government to work properly
in the first place.74 Virtue required that no citizen should be dependent upon
another, lest he be corrupted by that dependency and act in the interests of those on
whom he relied, rather than in the common interest. 7" Property ownership advanced
virtue by instilling values important to the preservation of autonomous and
responsible citizens: "an attachment to community, self-sufficiency, stability, and
wisdom. '76 "Only a person who was independent in this sense, who could transcend
selfish considerations and resist manipulation by men ambitious for power, was
truly free politically to act for the good of the commonwealth."77 Thus, although
71. Modem historians generally use "republican" or "republicanism" in reference to a combination of ideas
associated with the "country party" of the eighteenth-century English Opposition. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra
note 58, at 6. A brief description of the varying strains of Oppositionist thinking may be found in Fisher, supra note
44, at 72-74. A more thorough discussion of American republicanism and its relation to Oppositionist thought is
contained in MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 66-96. Republicanism was widespread during the Revolution and
continued to have significant (though waning) influence through the time of the Founding. See, e.g., FARBER &
SHERRY, supra note 58, at 6 (suggesting that American political philosophy ultimately was the product of synthesis
between republicanism and Lockean liberalism, with the latter gaining in influence by the time of the Constitutional
Convention); 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 47, at 67-68 (noting tension between, and ultimate fusion of, republican
and Lockean ideas in the Revolutionary period). The American political parties bearing the Republican name were
subsequent to and distinct from the republicanism discussed in this article.
72. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 58, at 13-14; 1 KELLY Er AL., supra note 47, at 67; MCDONALD,
supra note 45, at 70-71; Fisher, supra note 44, at 98. A famous contemporary explication of the republican notion
of public virtue was given by John Adams: "Men must be ready, they must pride themselves, and be happy to
sacrifice their private pleasures, passions, and interests, nay their private friendships and dearest connections, when
they stand in competition with the rights of society." Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (Apr. 16, 1776),
in I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 670 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
73. See LOCKE, supra note 60, at 362. Here, Locke was speaking most directly about taxation, but Professor
Stoebuck has demonstrated that Americans applied this idea to eminent domain as well. See Stoebuck, supra note
33, at 567.
74. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 75 (indicating that American republicans, despite regional and
philosophical differences, uniformly "embraced the dogma that landownership was a natural preservative of
virtue").
75. See id. at 70-71; Treanor, supra note 32, at 821-22.
76. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 58, at 13.
77. See 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 47, at 37.
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their focus was different, republicans (like Locke) generally viewed private property
as essential to preserving a legitimate political order.
Thus, by the time of the Constitutional Convention, property rights had long held
a central place in American legal and political thought, and this centrality was
preserved by the American legal culture after ratification. Courts during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries repeatedly demonstrated a general belief
in the sanctity of private property, viewing it as directly related to the freedom and
well-being of the people.78 Riding circuit in Pennsylvania, Justice Washington
included "the right to acquire and possess property of every kind" among those
"fundamental" liberties "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments."79 A Virginiajurist went further, describing "the means of possessing
property" as "the only means, so far as the Government is concerned, besides the
security of his person, [that an individual has] of obtaining happiness.,80 As such,
the security of an individual's private property was just as essential to the
maintenance of liberty as was his personal safety." The chief justice of Kentucky
likewise indicated that "[tihe rights of private property are essential to the happiness
of man" and that "[riespect for the laws under which vested private rights were
acquired, is a moral sentiment, common to all civilized people of all nations."82 For
this reason, "retrospective laws aimed at the destruction of private rights and vested
interests, are denounced as generally oppressive and unjust, and as only to be
tolerated under urgent and imperious circumstances of public interest." 83
This linkage between property and liberty clearly hearkened back to the English
and colonial legal tradition, in which property and liberty intertwined to form the
core rights of Englishmen.' It also affirmed the influential philosophies of the
Revolution and Confederation era, in which individual property rights played such
an important role. In his Commentaries on American Law, for example, Chancellor
Kent echoed republican thinkers by speaking of property as a mechanism of public
virtue and progress:
The sense of property is graciously bestowed on mankind for the purpose of
rousing them from sloth, and stimulating them to action .... The natural and active
sense of property pervades the foundations of social improvement. It leads to the
cultivation of the earth, the institution of government, the establish-ment of
justice, the acquisition of the comforts of life, the growth of the useful arts, the
78. See 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 47, at 186-87 (discussing protection of property rights as characteristic
of Marshall Court decisions); Polly J. Price, A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare
Decises, and Property Rights, 5 AVE MARIA L. REv. 113, 149 (2007) (discussing connection between property
rights and state courts' development of stare decisis doctrine).
79. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (Washington, Circuit Justice).
80. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 276 (1828) (Green, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
81. See id.
82. Beard v. Smith, 22 Ky. (6 T.B. Mon.) 430, 476 (1828) (Bibb, C.J.).
83. Id. at 477.
84. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 13; see also Ely, supra note 49, at 917 (noting that English
constitutionalism "had long treated property and liberty as interdependent concepts").
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spirit of commerce, the productions of taste, the erections of charity, and the
display of the benevolent affections. 5
Justice Chase likewise associated the protection of property with republican virtue,
charging jurors:
[T]hat our free Republican Governments cannot be preserved without the
Republican virtues of probity, and industry; frugality, and temperance .... That
without the restraint of Laws Liberty cannot exist in a State of Society .... That
good Laws cannot be put in execution without good morals; and... That Religion
and piety; morality and virtue, are the only pure foundations of National
happiness.-Any government, whatever may be its form, that does not give
protection and Security to the property.. .of its Citizens is unworthy of
obedience, and defense.86
In addition to these republican notions, many judges discussed property in terms
directly reminiscent of Locke. One of the more famous of these discussions
occurred in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, where Justice Patterson explained:
[T]he right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one
of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of
property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their
natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them
to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which
he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation
of property then is a primary object of the social compact ......
In similar fashion, a Virginia jurist explained that the "security of private
property.. .is one of the primary objects of Civil Government, which our ancestors,
in framing our Constitution, intended to secure to themselves and their posterity,
effectually, and for ever.""8
These notions clearly influenced how judges viewed the role of republican
governments elected by and representing the interests of the people. Justice Story,
for example, described "the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their
property legally acquired" as "a great and fundamental principle of a republican
government."89 Thus, according to a Louisiana jurist of the same period, the
government was obliged "to protect the citizens in the enjoyment of their property,"
such protection being one of "the first principles of the social compact." 9 This
attitude was shared by a New York judge, who opined that "[i]t is repugnant to the
first principles ofjustice, and the equal and permanent security of rights, to take, by
law, the property of one individual, without his consent, and give it to another."9'
85. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *319.
86. Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the Current
Political War Over the Judiciary, 39 LOY. U. Cmn. L.J. 427,465 (2008) (quoting Justice Chase's manuscript Jury
Charge Book).
87. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (Patterson, Circuit Justice).
88. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 276 (1828) (Green, J., concurring).
89. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50-51 (1815).
90. Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 530, 556 (La. 1815) (Derbigny, J.).
91. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477,493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Thompson, J.).
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In similar vein, Chief Justice Marshall declared that "[the] sense of justice and of
right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be
outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights
annulled."92 Justice Chase explained that, in republican governments like the United
States, the legislature generally possesses no authority "to take away that security
for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government
was established."93 And these limitations are not dependent on any textual warrants
found in the federal or state constitutions themselves. To the contrary, "[tlo
maintain that our federal, or state, Legislature possess such powers, if they had not
been expressly restrained, would.. .be a political heresy altogether inadmissible in
our free republican governments."94
These sentiments obviously flowed in part from the legal and philosophical
traditions inherited by these jurists.95 Additionally, private property ownership
seems to have received an exalted status based on the unique prospects presented
by the American situation. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, land
constituted the basic form of wealth, and land in America was "abundant and
fertile." 96 Thus, there was an unprecedented opportunity to seek both the republican
ideal of widespread property ownership (with its resulting civic virtues) and more
liberal notions of individual prosperity and affluence. To capitalize on this
opportunity, Americans needed free and stable land markets, 97 which (experience
during the Revolution and Confederation era had shown) was often threatened by
governmental interference.98 For this reason, among others, the legal culture
understood individual, societal, and economic freedom to depend on individual
rights in private property. Perhaps the definitive pronouncement came from Justice
Story's decision for the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Leland: "That government
can scarcely be deemed to be free where the rights of property are left solely
dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred."99
B. The Compensation Principle
Many of the foregoing statements, at first blush, raise more questions than
answers about the ideas embodied in the Takings Clause. If private property
enjoyed such a central place in the early American legal culture, if the government
generally possessed no right to expropriate the property interests of its citizens, then
there seems to be no need to protect against governmental takings at all. Of course,
the eighteenth-century conception of property entailed more than the rights of the
individual owner. Rather, property was understood as a complex web of rights,
92. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87 (1833).
93. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
94. Id. at 388-89.
95. See generally supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
96. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 202.
97. See generally id. at 206-13.
98. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
99. See 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
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duties, powers, and limitations divided between the individual, society, and the
state.'0 As such, aside from those rights belonging to the individual property owner,
the notion of property included certain rights enjoyed by the government itself.
Included in these rights was the authority to regulate economic activity, as well
as the right, either inherently or by reservation, to take private property for public
use.' O' The government's taking authority appears to have developed from two
separate, yet related, powers. The first, vested in the executive, was the king's
prerogative to make use of private land or goods in connection with defending the
realm, dispensing justice, providing for the royal household, and certain other
affairs within the province of the Crown." 2 The second, vested in the legislature,
was the power of eminent domain, under which Parliament could expropriate the
real property of private citizens, including entire possessory estates, for public
use. 103
Although the prerogative power and eminent domain remained distinct
governmental functions, they shared (to varying degrees) at least one important
feature-the provision of compensation to the affected property owner. While most
of the prerogative acts were accomplished without compensation, Professor
Stoebuck indicates that "the ancient and universal practice seems to have been to
require payment of full value" in the case of purveyances made for the royal
household. 1°4 In keeping with this practice, the Magna Carta explicitly prohibited
the King's representatives from "tak[ing] anyone's grain or other chattels, without
immediately paying for them in money, unless he is able to obtain a postponement
at the good will of the seller."'0 5 Thus, the compensation principle dates at least to
1215 with regard to certain executive appropriations. Exactly when compensation
became associated with legislative appropriations remains uncertain, although
Professor Stoebuck dates it to sometime in the early sixteenth century."0 6
100. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 12-13.
101. See id. at 13, 22; see also Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 557-60 (discussing "reserved-power" and
"inherent-power" theories of eminent domain). Whether the regulatory and taking functions were completely
distinct, or whether a regulation could sometimes amount to a taking of property, remains the subject of intense
academic disagreement. Compare Hart, supra note 30, at 1101 (arguing that compensation originally was provided
only for direct appropriation and not for regulatory action), and Treanor, supra note 31, at 782 (arguing that
"original understanding of the Takings Clause.. .required compensation when the federal government physically
took private property, but not when government regulations limited the ways in which property could be used"),
with Claeys, supra note 42, at 1553 (arguing that early state courts developed and applied doctrine akin to modem
regulatory takings), and Gold, supra note 36, at 184 (arguing that there is "insufficient evidence to prove just
compensation excludes regulatory takings" as a matter of original understanding). See also DANA & MERRLL,
supra note 31, at 19 (suggesting that both sides of debate overstate their cases); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Anti-
Federalist Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Takings Jurisprudence, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 967, 973-74 (2005)
(positing that both sides are wrong and offering alternative theory that what amounted to a taking depended on
availability of common law writ for challenging governmental action at issue). Attempts to resolve this debate are
beyond the scope of this article.
102. See Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 563.
103. See id. at 564.
104. Id. at 563.
105. See Magna Carta, art. 28 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 43, at 16.
106. See Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 566 (citing Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514-15) (requiring compensation
for damage occasioned by river improvements performed by city officials in Canterbury); Star. 31 Hen. 8, c. 4
(1539) (requiring compensation in connection with clearing projects performed on River Exe by city officials in
Exeter)).
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By the beginning of American colonialism, then, compensation seems to have
been a prevalent feature of the taking power.'0 7 Importantly, however, the payment
of compensation remained, as did the exercise of eminent domain itself, a creature
of statutory pronouncement. In England, property could not be taken without a
special act of Parliament until almost the eve of the American Revolution, °8 and no
judicial decision on either side of the Atlantic required compensation without that
result being compelled by express statutory language."' Nonetheless, there is
general agreement that colonial statutes commonly provided payment to landowners
whose property was taken." 0 By the time of the Constitutional Convention,
legislators had begun including references to the compensation principle in
fundamental government documents. In 1777, for example, Vermont became the
first state specifically to require the payment of just compensation as a
constitutional matter,"' and Massachusetts followed in kind three years later.1
2
Congress likewise included a just-compensation provision in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, enacted contemporaneously with the convening of the
convention in Philadelphia. 1 3 Thus, by 1787, the compensation principle was a
longstanding part of the Anglo-American legal culture.
In light of this history, the absence of express just compensation language in the
original Constitution remains something of a mystery. To be sure, the Constitution
contained several provisions aimed at curbing many of the abuses against property
rights to which the governments of the newly independent states had been most
prone. "'4 The delegates' focus, however, remained on internal design and structural
107. Id. at 579.
108. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 22.
109. Cf. Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 575; Treanor, supra note 31, at 788.
110. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1283 (1996); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL.
U. L. REv. 367, 381 (1991); McConnell, supra note 31, at 281; Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 579; Treanor, supra
note 31, at 787. Whether compensation was an established legal right or merely a matter of political expediency,
however, remains an open question. Scholars such as Professor Stoebuck have intimated that compensation was
a well-established substantive right, describing it as "a principle of the common law-of immemorable usage in
our land and in the land of our land." See Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 583. Others have been more reticent. Dean
Treanor, for example, while recognizing that compensation was the usual practice in the colonies, argues that it
was not considered to be an indestructible legal right. See Treanor, supra note 31, at 788 n.28; William Michael
Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
94 YALE L. J. 694, 695 (1985).
111. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. L art. IL reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 43, at 365
("[P]rivate property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it; nevertheless, whenever any
particular man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.").
Although this version of Vermont's constitution was never ratified, the just compensation requirement remained
in the version finally adopted in 1786. See VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. II, reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
3752 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1993) (1909).
112. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. X, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 43, at 375-76
("[W]henever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public
uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.").
113. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 43, at
395 ("[Slhould the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's
property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same.").
114. See U.S. CONST. art. L § 8 (giving federal government authority to lay and collect taxes, regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, establish uniform bankruptcy laws, regulate the currency, and fix uniform weights
and measures); U.S. CONST. art. L § 10 (prohibiting states from coining their own money, issuing bills of credit,
[Vol. 39
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
protections, such as dividing governmental power both vertically (i.e., federalism)
and horizontally (i.e., separation of powers). No provision expressly secured
property from governmental confiscation or expropriation, nor did it mandate the
payment of compensation upon the taking of property in the public interest. A
possible reason for this omission could be that, as Madison famously suggested in
Federalist No. 10, the Founders believed that an extended republic effectively
would impede widespread encroachments on property rights." 5 By the time he
offered his proposed amendments to the Constitution on June 8, 1789, however,
Madison apparently had become convinced that a just-compensation provision
would be profitable. Among the amendments offered was language stating that
"[n]o person shall.. .be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary
for public use, without a just compensation." 1 6 Of the proposals that ultimately
became the Bill of Rights, the one concerning takings was among the least
controversial, "occasioning no recorded substantive comment at all.""..7
Professor Fisher has suggested that the delay (and seeming disinterest) in an
express just-compensation provision may have "derived in part from uncertainty
regarding the efficacy of judicially enforced bills of rights in preventing
governmental invasions of private liberties." 8 To the extent the Framers feared
such provisions would be little more than ineffective "paper barriers,""' the
judiciary proved those fears to be unfounded. Courts early and frequently
demonstrated a willingness to strike down legislative acts that resulted in
uncompensated takings, even in the absence of explicit constitutional protections.
A 1792 decision from South Carolina, for example, declared void an act of the state
legislature that purported to confirm the title of one claimant as against the rights
of a prior owner.20 In doing so, the court indicated that "it was against common
right, as well as against Magna Charta, to take away the freehold of one man, and
vest it in another; and that, too, to the prejudice of third persons, without anycompensation. '2 In 1805, the North Carolina court voided an act of the state
legislature that divested certain lands, without compensation, from the Trustees of
the University of North Carolina, stating that such "property is as completely
beyond the control of the Legislature, as the property of individuals."'' 22 Although
the court did not specifically rely on the lack of compensation in reaching its
decision, later North Carolina judges understood the case as mandating
compensation to the landowner.123 The Massachusetts and New York courts issued
making anything other than gold and silver coin tender in payment of debt, enacting bills of attainder, and
impairing the obligation of contracts).
115. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
116. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
117. McConnell, supra note 31, at 283.
118. See Fisher, supra note 44, at 103.
119. The phrase "paper barriers" comes from Madison's speech introducing the Bill of Rights. See 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 455 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
120. See Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1792).
121. Id. at 254.
122. See Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58,88 (1805).
123. See Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 391, 419 (1818) (citing Foy for proposition that legislature
does not "possess the power of stripping one individual of his property without his consent, and without
compensation, and transferring it to another").
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numerous decisions indicating that compensation was a requisite for the
government's ability to take private property, 2' and judges in both states indicated
that this requirement existed regardless of any controlling constitutional
pronouncement. 125 Decisions from other states were in accord. 1
26
The compensation principle also featured prominently in several federal
decisions of the era. Even though the Takings Clause did not apply to the states, the
federal courts found little problem in reaching the same results under the Contracts
Clause 27 or under "general principles."'' 28 As early as 1795, Justice Patterson
declared that "[elvery person ought to contribute his proportion for public purposes
and public exigencies; but no one can be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his
whole property, real and personal, for the good of the community, without receiving
a recompence in value.', 129 A year later, two Justices expressed their belief that the
state of Virginia owed indemnity to debtors who, in reliance on an invalid relief
measure, paid their debts to the state but now found themselves again subject to
their British creditors. 30 The bases for this belief, at least for Justice Chase,
included "the immutable principles of justice.. .recognized by the Constitution,
which declares, 'that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
124. See, e.g., Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466 (1815); Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 (1811);
Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489 (1807); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822); People
v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
125. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 20 Johns. at 105 (stating that just-compensation provisions of federal and state
constitutions did not control the decision, but were "declaratory of a great and fundamental principle of
government"); accord Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. 344,507 (1829) (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Beard v. Smith, 22 Ky. (6 T.B. Mon.) 430,498 (1828) (Bibb, C.J.) (recognizing that private
interests must yield at times to public good, but stating that "Ulustice consists in making compensation in such
cases"); Piscataqua Bridge Co. v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834) (holding that infringement of exclusive
franchise was lawful only upon payment ofjust compensation); Reese v. Addams, 16 Serg. & Rawle 40 (Pa. 1827)
(indicating that constitutional provision for compensation protects vested lien rights as well as fee simple estates);
Barrow v. Page, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 97 (1818) (upholding trespass action where no compensation was provided to
landowner); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828) (voiding as uncompensated taking act
requiring dam owners to build locks or have dams abated).
127. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10. Property rights played a dominant role in several of the Supreme Court's earliest
Contracts Clause cases. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 643-44,
653 (1819) (holding that college charter under which private donations were made was "a contract for the security
and disposition of property" and state legislation altering charter was "subversive of that contract, on the faith of
which [such] property was given"); id. at 664-65 (Washington, J., concurring) (equating alteration of college
charter to appropriation for public road); id. at 702-03 (Story, J., concurring) (equating alteration of college charter
to divestment of property); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 166-67 (1812) (holding that tax
exemption forming part of consideration in land transaction ran with land and could not be repealed without
violating Contracts Clause); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (holding that Contracts Clause,
as well as "general principles which are common to our free institutions," restrained state from passing law
declaring vested land titles null and void). This connection between vested property rights and vested contract
rights was made explicit by Justice Baldwin: "Though the divesting of vested rights of property, is no violation,
per se, of the constitution of the United States, yet when those rights are vested by a contract, its obligation cannot
be impaired by a state law." See Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 828 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830)
(Baldwin, Circuit Justice) (citations omitted).
128. See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (voiding statute divesting private corporation
of property previously acquired as inconsistent with "the principles of natural justice,.. .the fundamental laws of
every free government,.. .the spirit and the letter of the constitution of the United States, and.. .the decisions of most
respectable judicial tribunals").
129. See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 304, 309 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (Patterson, Circuit
Justice).
130. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 199, 245 (1796) (Chase, J.); id. at 283 (Cushing, J.).
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compensation. ',131 Justice Chase alluded again to the compensation principle in
Calder v. Bull, this time linking it to notions of legitimate legislative action: "It is
not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will pass laws to deprive
citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless for the benefit of the whole
community; and on making full satisfaction."1 32 In similar vein, Chief Justice
Marshall rhetorically asked whether any limits could be said to exist on legislative
power "if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized
without compensation."' 33 By 1830, Justice Baldwin stated in definitive terms that
"the obligation to make just compensation is concomitant with the right" to take
property for public use.'34 In keeping with these pronouncements, state actions that
divested property owners without compensation were often declared void by the
federal courts.'35
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, many courts of the era invoked the compensation
principle despite the lack of an explicit governing constitutional text. Although
some jurists grounded the compensation requirement in their English legal
heritage, 36 many courts suggested that it was derived from natural law and the
nature of free governments. In large part, these ideas flowed from Locke's
conception of the social compact.' Because individuals form government to
protect their natural rights to property, government must indeed provide such
protection to maintain its legitimacy. In those circumstances where the public good
mandates the yielding of individual property interests, the protection for property
implicit in the social compact is satisfied by requiring remuneration to the owner. 38
Several jurists of the period suggested as much. Chancellor Kent, for example,
cited authorities from both the civil and common law traditions in explaining that
compensation "is adopted by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep
and universal sense of justice."'39 A subsequent New York jurist, after explaining
that no express compensation provision governed the case under decision,
nonetheless held that compensation was required by a "great and fundamental
principle of government; and any law violating that principle must be deemed a
nullity, as it is against natural right and justice."'40 Chief Justice Parker of
Massachusetts stated that the compensation provisions in the United States and
Massachusetts Constitutions were simply declaratory, "for without these provisions,
I hesitate not to say, that nowhere, except where a despotism of some kind or other
131. Id. at 245 (Chase, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
132. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798) (Chase, J.).
133. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
134. Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 828 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (Baldwin, Circuit
Justice).
135. See supra notes 127-29 and cases cited therein.
136. See Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 59 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1796) (Waties, J., dissenting)
(explaining that "sacred principle of compensation" was part of "ancient common law of the land" acquired from
England); Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 252, 254 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1792) (suggesting that compensation
was derived from "common right, as well as.. .Magna Charta").
137. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) (stating that power
of eminent domain is necessary to vitality of government, but "justice is done, by allowing [owners] a reasonable
equivalent" for what is taken).
139. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
140. Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
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existed, could the government lay its hands upon the property of any subject without
making him a fair compensation."'' A Virginia judge found the compensation
requirement rooted in "Natural Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Law of
every civilized country."' 42 Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Story suggested
that compensation might be required "by the universal law of all free
governments."' 43 Justice Baldwin, riding circuit, indicated that the Takings Clause
was a "declaration of what in its nature is the power of all governments, and the
right of its citizens; the one to take property, the other to compensation.""' Thus,
"[tihe obligation attaches to the exercise of the power, though it is not provided for
by the state constitution, or that of the United States had not enjoined."' 45
The preceding discussion illustrates that compensation was a vital part of the
legal culture's conviction that vested property rights should be protected from
undue governmental interference. This is not to say, however, that the law required
compensation in every instance. To the contrary, landowners seeking enforcement
of the compensation principle met with resistance in at least three categories of
cases: (1) military impressments;' 46 (2) claims for consequential damages to
property resulting from governmental action not directed toward that property;
147
and (3) takings for public roads.'48 But in none of these categories did the courts
fundamentally reject the validity of the compensation principle. With regard to
military impressments, for example, the courts seemed to distinguish between true
emergency situations-those where appropriation was necessary to aid military
endeavors or prevent useful supplies from falling into enemy hands-and
circumstances of a less urgent nature. In the former, uncompensated takings might
be justified; in the latter, uncompensated takings clearly were illegal. 149
Likewise, the cases declining to award consequential damages were not
antithetical to the general requirement of compensating an owner whose property
was taken by government action. Rather, the denial of consequential damages
flowed from the conclusion that no taking had occurred in the first place. One of the
leading consequential damages cases, Callender v. Marsh, 50 proves illustrative.
There, the plaintiff landowner brought suit against a Boston city official for
regrading the street next to the plaintiff's house so as to expose its foundation and
141. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. 344, 507 (1829) (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
142. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 265 (1828).
143. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 38 (1823).
144. Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 828 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Barrow v. Page, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 97 (1818); Respublica v. Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 357,
362-63 (Pa. 1788).
147. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 430-31 (1823).
148. See, e.g., Renthrop v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97 (La. 1816); Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N.J.L. 196 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1832); M'Clenachan v. Curwen, 6 Binn. 509 (Pa. 1802); Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L (2 Bay) 38 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. 1796).
149. See Barrow, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) at 98-99 (indicating that uncompensated taking may be justified in
cases of "extreme and invincible public necessity.. .to render an attack upon an enemy successful, or to defeat his
attempts," but in "all other cases" the "positive and.. .fundamental law" of compensation controls); Sparhawk, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) at 362-63 (allowing uncompensated taking of goods "necessary to the maintenance of the
Continental army, or useful to the enemy, and in danger of falling into their hands" because the seizure "happened
flagrante bello...; for, otherwise, it would clearly have been a trespass").
150. 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823).
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require costly repairs.' 5 ' In rejecting the claim, the court indicated that the
compensation requirement applied "to the case of property actually taken and
appropriated by the government," but not to one "who suffers an indirect or
consequential damage or expense, by means of the right use of property already
belonging to the public." '52 Put differently, compensation was due as a matter of law
when the owner suffered some loss or destruction of a recognized property interest
(akin to what modern lawyers might think of as the core rights of exclusion,
possession, use, and disposition). Compensation was not due when the owner
merely suffered monetary damages as an incidental effect of government action not
aimed at those rights. Thus, the compensation principle remained intact-it just did
not apply to the plaintiff's situation because the government had taken no property
interest from him (that is, the government's regrading of a public street, whatever
its incidental economic effect, did not destroy or diminish the core rights of the
adjacent parcel). Nonetheless, the moral force of the compensation principle, even
though legally inapplicable, compelled the court to suggest that the legislature
provide a remedy for comparable cases in the future.'53
Similar conclusions can be drawn from a review of the cases dealing with public
roads. Although these decisions may be explained as a holdover from the colonial
era, where compensation usually was not provided for the laying out of public
thoroughfares across undeveloped land,' 54 a close review reveals that perhaps they
were not as inconsistent with the compensation requirement as might first appear.
In Paxson v. Sweet,'55 for example, the New Jersey court rejected a challenge to a
Trenton city ordinance requiring lot owners to install curb stones and foot ways in
front of their lots. In doing so, the court assumed that the ordinance effected a
taking that required compensation, but it reasoned that the benefits received from
the city-wide project provided adequate recompense.'56 Thus, Paxson found that the
plaintiff had been compensated, even though some of his property rights had been
restrained, because the law "enlarge[d] the rights retained to make them as or more
valuable than the rights lost."'57 A similar conclusion was reached in M'Clenachan
151. Id. at 418.
152. Id. at 430.
153. See id. at 434-35 (asking "whether an application to the legislature ought not to be made" because
"there seems to be no good reason why others, whose property is enhanced in value at their neighbour's expense,
should not be held to furnish part of the indemnity").
154. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (indicating that power to lay road
across wild land without compensation "has been assumed and acted upon without a question, ever since we
became an independent government"); Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 56 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1796) (stating
that "the authority of the state.. .to appropriate a portion of the soil of every country for public roads and highways,
was one of the original rights of sovereignty, retained by the supreme power of every community at its formation")
(Grimke & Bay, JJ.). Importantly, the Lindsay court was evenly divided over the landowner's right to receive
compensation, and the two judges voting against the owner previously had applied the compensation principle in
another context. Compare id., with Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 252,254 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1792) (Grimke
& Bay, JJ.) (holding that legislative act transferring estate from one citizen to another without compensating the
first was "ipso facto, void").
155. 13 N.J.L. 196 (1832).
156. See id. at 199 ("The citizen receives it in part, by [the improvements] adding to his private property an
increase of its intrinsic value either for sale or enjoyment; by the health and comfort of his own household; by his
enjoyment of the like foot ways everywhere else, in which he freely participates without contributing to their
expense....").
157. See Claeys, supra note 42, at 1587.
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v. Curwen, where the Pennsylvania court rejected a challenge to the appropriation
of the plaintiff's land for a public turnpike.5 8 As with Paxson, however, the court's
decision was not based on a disagreement with the compensation principle. Rather,
the decision was grounded in the peculiar nature of Pennsylvania land grants, which
gave, free of charge, each grantee 6 percent more land than he actually purchased,
the additional land being reserved for the building of public roads if and when
necessary. 59 For this reason, the plaintiff was entitled to no payment now, "such
compensation having been originally made in each purchaser's particular grant.""6°
The Louisiana court hinted at a similar analysis in Renthorp v. Bourg, noting that
the state's French and Spanish predecessors "granted their land gratuitously, but a
reservation was generally made for roads."'16 1
Thus, instead of being hostile to the compensation principle, many of the cases
in the foregoing categories appear to have confirmed its validity. On the whole, the
judicial decisions from this period paint a relatively consistent picture-the legal
culture accepted the longstanding compensation principle as a key mechanism in
protecting private property from undue governmental interference.
C. The Role of the Courts
A third major characteristic of the early American view of property rights was
an increasing reliance on the judiciary, rather than the political branches, as the
ultimate guardian of those rights. This characteristic has to some extent already
been featured in the preceding sections, especially with regard to the willingness of
the courts to strike down laws violating the compensation principle. As with the
other characteristics highlighted in those sections, this third characteristic of early
American legal culture was shaped by the traditions, philosophies, and experiences
of the past.
Restrictions on the executive, in the form of compensation requirements for
certain royal purveyances, were among the earliest limitations placed on the
government's taking authority. 162 In the eyes of early Americans, such restrictions
made perfect sense. Taking their cues from Blackstone, these Americans would
have understood the English historical experience as one in which the ancient
constitutional balance between power and liberty was repeatedly encroached upon
by the Crown and subsequently restored, finally culminating in the eighteenth-
century parliamentary system of king, lords, and commons.'63 Commentators have
noted that at the time of the Revolution executive power was considered "a far
greater threat to liberty and property than the legislature,"' 64 a fact illustrated by
most of the early state governments "emasculat[ing] their executive branches.' ' 65
158. 6Birm. 509, 514 (Pa. 1802).
159. Seeid. at511.
160. Id. at513.
161. 4Mart. (o.s.) 97, 135 (La. 1816).
162. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
163. See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *407-36; see also FORREST McDONALD, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 27-31 (1994) (discussing Blackstone's perspective).
164. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century
State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 57, 101 (1999).
165. See MCDONALD, supra note 163, at 126.
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Moreover, the Lockean pronouncement that property cannot be taken from an
individual without his consent almost certainly was designed to check the executive,
since consent included decisions made on behalf of individuals by their elected
representatives. Thus, Locke most distrusted executive abuses, not legislative ones.
Faith in legislative representatives was not unique to Lockean theory; it found
expression in republican thought, as well. The concept of public virtue (and its
concomitant belief that all members of the public shared identical interests) 66
initially led republicans to a "near-unbridled confidence in popularly elected
legislatures.' 67 As with Locke, this confidence in representative legislatures
corresponded to a general distrust of the Crown and its agents in the hereditary
aristocracy,168 as well as to a general faith in "the people."'69 In modem parlance,
the legislature was the "people's branch" and, therefore, best equipped to look after
the public interest and ward off corruption.
These ideas initially resulted in a general rejection of executive authority and the
vesting of "virtually unlimited powers" in American legislatures. 70 Thus, the first
constitutional provisions protecting against abuses of the taking power were aimed
directly at the executive by prohibiting, in Lockean fashion, expropriations without
the consent of the owner or his representatives.' 7 ' The behavior of the state
legislatures after the Revolution, however, ultimately revealed that this confidence
in popularly elected representatives was misplaced. In light of these experiences,
many Americans became convinced that their legislative representatives, and the
people from whom they derived authority, were just as prone to corruption as those
exercising executive powers. More effective methods for protecting liberty and
property were needed,'72 and chief among these was the inclusion of explicit
constitutional safeguards requiring just compensation upon the taking of private
property. 173
The question remained, however, whether these just-compensation provisions
constituted legally enforceable restrictions on the political branches or were merely
precatory. As late as 1828, a South Carolina court indicated that the Takings Clause
was not an enforceable limitation but rather "only the moral obligation by which the
166. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 57-58 (1969)
("What made.. the republican emphasis on the collective welfare of the people comprehensible was the assumption
that the people, especially when set against their rulers, were a homogeneous body whose interests candidly
considered are one." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
167. See Nathan Alexander Shales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public Use"
Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 353 (1999).
168. See id. at 354.
169. See McDONALD, supra note 45, at 160-62.
170. See id. at 160; see also I KELLY Er AL., supra note 47, at 73 (stating that "in practice.. .there proved
to be few effective limitations on the state legislatures").
171. See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXI, reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, supra note 11l, at 1688;
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIL reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TEITORIES, AND COLONIES, supra note 111, at 2788; N.Y. CONST. of
1777, art. XII, reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRIORIES, AND COLONIES, supra note 111, at 2632.
172. See 1 KELLYEr AL., supra note 47, at 73-74 (stating that "need to curtail state legislative power became
a central issue of constitutional reform in the 1780s").
173. See Brauneis, supra note 164, at 105 (noting that advent of constitutional just-compensation provisions
revealed distrust of legislative branch as well as executive).
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legislature is bound, to use [its taking] power discreetly and justly."' 74 Accordingly,
the court held that the compensation principle "cannot be enforced by this or any
other Court."'75
But this view appears to have been outside the mainstream. As already
mentioned, early American courts repeatedly enforced the compensation principle,
and they did so despite the consequences to the political branches. 76 One of the
earliest examples, in fact, comes from another South Carolina decision, Ham v.
McClaws.177 That case involved a statute prohibiting the importation of slaves into
South Carolina, under penalty of forfeiture. 178 Although the court did not
specifically mention the compensation principle, it made clear that it considered the
application of the statute to the defendants an abrogation of their vested property
rights. In this regard, the court noted that the defendants had inquired as to the
legality of importation prior to setting sail, that importation had indeed been legal
at that time, and that the forfeiture statute had been enacted while the defendants
were at sea. For this reason, the court declared the forfeiture to be illegal, even
though it clearly applied to the defendants on its face. Because no proper legislature
could be presumed to encroach upon vested property rights, the court was "bound
to give such a construction" to the statute "as [would] be consistent with justice, and
the dictates of natural reason, though contrary to the strict letter of the law."'179
Three years later, the same court more explicitly enforced the compensation
principle, invalidating an act of the legislature that affirmed the title of a subsequent
claimant over that of a predecessor without providing compensation to the latter. 80
Justice Patterson voided a similar statute from Pennsylvania in 1795, calling it "an
outrage on private property" and "a monster in legislation.''. Although he
conceded that legislators may be "the sole and exclusive judges" of the need for
taking private property, Justice Patterson was adamant that legislative authority ran
no further.'82 Calling attention to the fact "that the Judiciary in this country is not
a subordinate, but a co-ordinate, branch of the government,"'' 83 the Justice explained
that judicial intervention (including the assessment of ajury) was "a constitutional
guard upon property" and a necessary "barrier between the individual and the
legislature, [which] ought never to be removed; as long as it is preserved, the rights
of private property will be in no danger of violation, except in cases of absolute
necessity, or great public utility."' '
This trend of safeguarding property from abuse by the political branches grew
after the turn of the nineteenth century, with numerous decisions voiding or
174. Patrick v. Comm'rs of Cross Roads on Charleston Neck, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 541,543 (S.C. Ct. App.
1828).
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
177. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1789).
178. Id. at 93.
179. Id. at 98.
180. See Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1792).
181. Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
182. See id. at312.
183. Id. at 309.
184. Id. at 315.
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enjoining acts that violated the compensation principle.1 5 The results in these cases
tended to reflect an attitude similar to that voiced by Justice Patterson-the judicial
branch operated as a bulwark between the rights of the people and the power of the
government. Judge Green of Virginia, for example, explained "that the Legislative
and Judicial Departments, [are] distinct and separate; so that, neither shall exercise
the powers properly belonging to the other."'' 86 And the judge made clear that the
issue of whether a legislative act worked an invalid encroachment upon private
rights was a question "emphatically Judicial in.. .nature."'18 7 This comported with
the understanding of Chancellor Kent, who linked judicial authority directly to the
protection of individual rights:
With us, the power of the lawgiver is limited and defined; the judicial is regarded
as a distinct, independent power: private rights have been better understood and
more exalted in public estimation, as well as secured by provisions dictated by
the spirit of freedom, and unknown to the civil law."88
An early North Carolina decision declared that rights to property could not be
deprived "unless by a trial by Jury in a court of Justice, according to the known and
established rules of decision, derived from the common law, and such acts of the
Legislature as are consistent with the constitution."'8 9 A subsequent North Carolina
judge was even more to the point:
The transfer of property from one individual, who is the owner, to another
individual, is a Judicial and not a Legislative act. When the Legislature presumes
to touch private property, for any other than public purposes, and then only in
case of necessity, and rendering full compensation; it will behoove the Judiciary
to check its eccentric course, by refusing to give any effect to such acts.90
This attitude prevailed against the executive branch as well as the legislative.
Even after ratification of the Constitution, many Americans remained suspicious of
strong executive authority, and conflict between the executive and judicial branches
enjoyed a long history.' 9' American lawyers were familiar with the skirmishes
between James I and Sir Edward Coke in the seventeenth century, as well as the
latter's view (articulated in his Institutes of the Lawes of England) that the Crown
must operate within the bounds of the law as interpreted by common law judges.' 92
By the eighteenth century, Anglo-American courts had begun putting this view into
185. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815); Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489
(1807); Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 391 (1818); Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805);
Piscataqua Bridge v. N.H. Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822);
People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch.
1816); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
186. Crenshaw, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) at 277 (Green, J.).
187. See id.
188. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Kent, Ch. J.).
189. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 88.
190. Robinson, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) at 420 (Daniel, J.).
191. Interestingly, the lack of an independent judiciary was included among the grievances levied against
George III in the Declaration of Independence. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
192. See MCDoNALD, supra note 163, at 21-23; id. at 13 (listing Coke among commentators "routinely
studied" by American lawyers).
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practice, as explained by Robert Brauneis: "If an executive official committed acts
that were actionable at common law and that did not fall within the scope of a
legislative grant of authority, a court could hold that official personally liable for
damages."'93 As Professor Brauneis further explains, this framework for disciplining
executive officials provided the early model for just compensation litigation in
America.94 Thus, an aggrieved property owner would bring a common law action
(usually trespass) against the officials carrying out the alleged taking, those officials
would defend the claim based on some legislative authorization to perform the acts
in question, and the plaintiff would challenge that legislation as void for not
providing adequate compensation. 195 If the plaintiff succeeded on this final step,
then the officials named as defendants would be liable at common law, as explained
by a Massachusetts court in 1815:
[I]f the legislature should, for public advantage and convenience, authorize any
improvement, the execution of which would require or produce the destruction
or diminution of private property, without affording, at the same time, means of
relief and indemnification, the owner of the property destroyed or injured would
undoubtedly have his action at common law, against those who should cause the
injury, for his damages. 96
And unlike the legislature, executive officials enjoyed no discretion in determining
even the necessity for a taking in the first instance, since the exercise of such
discretion by the executive branch would result in "oppression and disproportioned
exactions."197
I. "POOR RELATION"-PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WILKIE
In contrast to the high regard for property rights demonstrated by the early
American legal culture, the majority opinion in Wilkie intimates that property rights
currently enjoy a much lesser status. As demonstrated below, the Court's decision
in Wilkie is at odds with each of the prevailing characteristics of the early American
legal culture included in the foregoing discussion.
A. The "Second-Class" Status of Property
Wilkie provides a subtle, yet definite, divergence from the perspectives of the
early American legal culture concerning the status of property rights generally.
Whereas that culture viewed private property as essential to the liberty and well-
being of the citizenry, and understood the protection of property rights as one of the
chief objects of the state, Wilkie reflects an attitude that property rights are not quite
as worthy as other rights protected by the Constitution.
193. Brauneis, supra note 164, at 101.
194. Id. at 102-05.
195. See id. at 67-68. For a clear example of this framework, see Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 (1811).
196. See Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466, 468 (1815); Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire
Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 70-72 (1834) (explaining that a tort action will not lie where just compensation is made, but
otherwise plaintiff may be entitled to damages and injunctive relief); Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co.,
3 F. Cas. 821,833-34 (C.C.D. NJ. 1830) (Baldwin, Circuit Justice) (distinguishing between damages remedy for
past trespass and injunction against future trespass, until compensation is made to property owner).
197. See Barrow v. Page, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 97, 100 (1818).
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An initial hint that constitutional property rights are no longer on equal footing
with other constitutional liberties was the Court's failure to address the substance
of Robbins's claim-i.e., that the BLM's conduct violated his rights under the
Takings Clause to receive just compensation for the easement demanded of him.
Given the procedural posture of the case, this failure is somewhat surprising.
Robbins's lawsuit reached the Court on an interlocutory appeal from the denial of
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which was based on a claimed
entitlement to qualified immunity. 98 It was the qualified immunity issue that
allowed the appeal in the first place, providing an exception to the normal rule that
litigants may only appeal final judgments. 99 In other contexts, the Court previously
had made clear that, in considering issues of qualified immunity at the summary
judgment stage, federal courts ordinarily should determine whether the alleged
conduct violates a constitutional right in the first instance. 200 The reason for this
primary step, according to the Court itself, is to promote the development of
constitutional issues and provide a mechanism by which rights may be clearly
established.20 ' By refusing to address the merits of Robbins's claim, then, the Court
was operating outside its own established boundaries for resolving the issues that
routinely arise in constitutional tort litigation.
The Court justified this departure by holding that, even if Robbins's
constitutional rights had been violated, his claim nonetheless was not remediable
under the Bivens doctrine. The Court indicated that the applicability of Bivens
depended on a two-step inquiry: (1) whether there existed alternative remedies to
protect the interests at issue; and (2) whether there were any "special factors
counseling hesitation. ' 20 2 In applying this framework, the Court first admitted that,
despite the existence of alternative avenues for relief, no single remedy was
available adequately to protect Robbins from the campaign of harassment he
alleged:
It is one thing to be threatened with the loss of grazing rights, or to be
prosecuted, or to have one's lodge broken into, but something else to be
subjected to this in combination over a period of six years, by a series of public
officials bent on making life difficult. Agency appeals, lawsuits, and criminal
defense take money and endless battling depletes the spirit along with the purse.
The whole here is greater than the sum of its parts.20 3
198. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (establishing "final judgment" rule); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
525-27 (1985) (recognizing exception to "final judgment" rule for denials of qualified immunity).
200. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In January 2009, the Court relaxed this requirement,
noting that it may often be appropriate but should not be considered compulsory. See Pearson v. Callahan, No. 07-
751, 2009 WL 128768, at *9 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009). Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that, at the time it decided
Wilkie, it was mandatory. See id. at *6 ("Saucier made that suggestion [i.e., first determining whether a
constitutional violation had occurred] a mandate.").
201. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Pearson, 2009 WL 128768, at *9 ("[T]he Saucier Court was
certainly correct in noting that the two-step procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent....").
202. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598.
203. See id. at 2600-01.
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Accordingly, the case had to be decided under the second analytical step, with the
Court evaluating any special factors that counseled against the application of
Bivens.2 4
It was here that the Court further displayed its view that property rights enjoy a
lesser status. The first "special factor" to which the Court turned its attention was
the "difficulty in defining a workable cause of action" for Robbins's claim.2" 5
Although the Court conceded that it previously had recognized retaliation claims
in the context of other constitutional rights,2°6 it found Robbins's claim to be
materially different. Whereas those previous cases "turn[ed] on an allegation of
impermissible purpose and motivation" on the part of government officials, the
Court viewed Robbins's claim as involving "a perfectly legitimate purpose: as a
landowner, the Government may have, and in this instance does have, a valid
interest in getting access to neighboring lands."20' The problem, according to the
Court, was not the BLM's purpose, but the methods used in achieving that
purpose.208 And the Court suggested that those methods were not particularly
troubling, stating that "[j]ust as a private landowner" can vigorously assert his own
interests in dealing with adjacent neighbors, "the Government too may stand firm
on its rights and use its power to protect public property interests. '' 2° In other
words, the Court understood the BLM' s conduct to amount to little more than hard
bargaining.210
Several things stand out about the Court's analysis in this regard. First, despite
the majority's assertions to the contrary, it is difficult to see why Robbins's claim
was substantively different from the Court's prior anti-retaliation precedents, other
than the nature of the rights involved. Although the majority viewed those prior
decisions as involving questions of improper purpose and motive, such questions
were no less central to Robbins's claim. The Court itself noted that Robbins
presented the following issue: "[C]an government officials avoid the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against taking property without just compensation by
using their regulatory powers to harass, punish, and coerce a private citizen into
giving the Government his property without payment? ' 21' As Justice Ginsburg
pointed out in dissent, the words "harass, punish, and coerce" indicate that the
officials' motives were vindictive, suggesting exactly the improper purpose and
motive at issue in the Court's prior cases; 212 in other words, Robbins contended that
204. See id. at 2600.
205. See id. at 2601. As demonstrated by Professor Tribe, Wilkie's evaluation of the "special factors" inquiry
seems to present a departure from the traditional Bivens framework, which tended to view "special factors
counseling hesitation" as including either implicit preclusion of Bivens based on the existence of an elaborate
remedial scheme established by Congress (as in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)) or claims involving
substantive areas entrusted especially to congressional authority (as in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304
(1983)). See Tribe, supra note 20, at 63-68.
206. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing anti-retaliation precedents concerning First Amendment speech rights,
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights, and Sixth Amendment jury trial rights).
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 2602.
210. See id. at 2604.
211. Id. at 2601 n.8 (alteration in original, emphasis added).
212. See id. at 2614 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the BLM improperly retaliated against him because he exercised his constitutional
right to be compensated for the taking of his property. The majority's inability (or
refusal) to make this connection is indicative of how it viewed the rights at issue.
Perhaps more telling was the Court's characterization of the BLM as engaged
merely in the "perfectly legitimate purpose" of obtaining a public easement." 3
Viewed in the light most favorable to Robbins, as was required at the summary
judgment stage, the facts suggest more than a simple operation to obtain an
easement across Robbins's ranch. In the words of the dissent, "[t]respassing, filing
false criminal charges, and videotaping women seeking privacy to relieve
themselves.. .are not the tools of 'hard bargaining.""'2 4 Indeed, it is hard to imagine
the Court describing similar conduct against a witness who refuses to waive his
right against self-incrimination, or against a criminal defendant who demands ajury
trial, as serving the "perfectly legitimate purpose" of ensuring that crimes are solved
and the guilty are punished." 5 Thus, it seems that the context in which the conduct
occurs-i.e., whether rights of property are involved or those of higher
constitutional caliber-is determinative of whether the government's conduct is
legitimate.
Moreover, even if the BLM's goal in obtaining the easement was itself
legitimate, under the Court's prior precedents that would not necessarily preclude
a retaliation claim if the BLM also sought to punish Robbins for asserting his
constitutional rights. The Court's decision in Board of County Commissioners,
Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr,2"6 cited by the Wilkie majority,27 makes
clear that a retaliation claim may involve mixed motives, some legitimate and others
not.218 Such claims proceed under a burden-shifting framework, with the plaintiff
proving that the constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in the
response of the government, and the government defending that response by
showing that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the
protected conduct. 219 This comports with the "elaborate jurisprudence of causation,
burden shifting, criteria of seriousness, and the like" that the Court has developed
when dealing with retaliation claims in a host of other circumstances, from the First
Amendment to private employment discrimination. 22 Again, the primary difference
between these cases and Wilkie appears to be the nature of the rights involved.
At bottom, Wilkie leaves the impression that, for reasons not entirely or
satisfactorily explained by the Court, the property rights embodied in the Takings
Clause are not of the same caliber as those rights protected in the Court's prior
cases addressing government retaliation. For this reason, Wilkie reflects a departure
213. Id. at 2601.
214. Id. at 2615 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,83-85 (1973) (holding unconstitutional retaliatory measures taken
against government independent contractors that refused to waive Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571-72 (1968) (voiding as unconstitutional statute that
authorized imposition of capital punishment only in cases where defendant demanded jury trial).
216. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
217. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2601 (discussing Umbehr).
218. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
219. Id. at 675.
220. See Tribe, supra note 20, at 44.
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from the understanding of the early American legal culture, which viewed the
protection of property as central to the maintenance of liberty, the fostering of
virtue, and the very legitimacy of government itself.
B. Erosion of the Compensation Principle
In addition to exhibiting a different perspective toward property rights generally,
the Wilkie decision also reflects a specific erosion of the Constitution's guarantee
ofjust compensation. At the heart of the dispute between the BLM and Robbins was
the latter's right to demand compensation for the easement sought by the
government, either through a negotiated payment or as the result of formal
condemnation proceedings. The BLM's refusal to take either course, but instead to
pressure Robbins into submission, seems to present the very sort of conduct that the
Takings Clause was designed to thwart.22 As demonstrated, many early American
courts held that the payment ofjust compensation was dictated, even in the absence
of explicit textual requirements, by basic notions of justice flowing from the
primary purposes of government itself-i.e., the fostering and protection of liberty
and property.222 In other words, "the obligation to make just compensation [was]
concomitant with the right" to take property in the first place. 223 Where the
obligation was absent, so was the right.
These ideas suggest that the early courts would have seen the BLM's campaign
against Robbins as violating the rights protected by the compensation principle-
specifically, "[Robbins's] right to refuse to grant the Government something for
nothing. '224 By rejecting Robbins's claim, and by failing even to address whether
his constitutional rights were violated, the Court in Wilkie directly undermined the
compensation principle in a way that seems foreign to the understanding of the early
American legal culture. As Justice Ginsburg explained: "The constitutional
guarantee ofjust compensation would be worthless if federal agents were permitted
to harass and punish landowners who refuse to give up property without it. '225 After
Wilkie, however, it is not at all clear what barriers exist to such conduct, or what
value the compensation principle has if such conduct cannot be redressed.
The majority's answer provides little in the way of clarification. In keeping with
its characterization of the BLM's conduct as "hard bargaining," the Court suggested
that, although "the Government was not offering to buy the easement," it "did have
valuable things to offer in exchange, like continued permission for Robbins to use
Government land on favorable terms (at least to the degree that the terms of a
221. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
222. It is fairly easy to see the tension between the Court's holding in Wilkie and the Lockean notion that
government exists primarily for the protection of individual property interests. But Wilkie seems to run afoul of
republican ideas as well. Although (in republican terms) it might be argued that landowners such as Robbins should
submit their personal interests to the needs of the public, the compensation principle provides the safeguard that
empowers a citizen in Robbins's position (again, in republican terms) to resist ambition and corruption. If
government officials can expropriate property without compensation, then the citizen may cower to those (such
as politicians, other officials, or wealthy campaign contributors) who can promise better protection for his own
interests, thereby losing his independence and ability to act freely in the best interests of the public at large.
223. See Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821,828 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (Baldwin, Circuit
Justice).
224. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2617 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2618.
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permit were subject to discretion). '226 At first blush, this hints at an understanding
of the compensation principle similar to that demonstrated by several of the early
American cases concerning public roads-i.e., the requirement for compensation
might be satisfied in ways other than direct monetary payment.227 Whatever its
general validity, however, this understanding is belied by the specific facts in
Wilkie, which viewed in the light most favorable to Robbins, raise a strong
inference that the BLM was doing more than simply negotiating the price of the
easement. Indeed, at one of the earliest meetings with Robbins, a BLM official
allegedly told Robbins that "the Federal Government does not negotiate.,,228
Moreover, the Court's indication that the government can condition discretionary
benefits in exchange for the surrender of a landowner's right to just compensation
is at odds with its earlier pronouncement about similar choice-based dilemmas in
Dolan:
Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government
may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange
for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought
has little or no relationship to the property.229
Finally, the Court's identification of the government with any other private land-
owner fails to recognize what was clearly understood by the early legal culture: that
government was established in the first instance largely to help secure its citizens
in their property, and that unrestrained government often ran afoul of this
purpose.230 Early Americans recognized the compensation principle as critical to
protecting private property from abuse by the protectors themselves, and the courts
wielded the compensation principle both to void acts of the legislature and to
impose liability on errant executive officials. Wilkie, by contrast, weakens the force
of the compensation principle by suggesting that government officers who ignore
it have little to lose.
C. Whither Judicial Protection?
As a final observation, Wilkie raises questions about the future role of the federal
courts in protecting constitutional property rights from encroachment by the
political branches. Unlike the early legal culture, which increasingly looked to the
judiciary as a barrier between individual rights and the potential abuse of both
executive and legislative power, the Wilkie Court expressly shrinks from this role
despite the admitted unavailability of any other sufficient remedy for the property
owner. And the Court's explanation for its rejection of Robbins's claim leaves open
226. See id. at 2602-03.
227. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
228. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2593 (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); cf Bd. of County Comm'rs, wabaunsee County,
Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) ("[O]ur modem 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine holds that the
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of
speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit." (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).
230. See supra notes 162-97 and accompanying text.
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whether property owners should expect meaningful review of property rights cases
in the future.
In addition to its inability to define a workable cause of action for Robbins's
claim (its prior retaliation precedents notwithstanding), the Wilkie majority found
a second factor counseling hesitation-"the reasonable fear that a general Bivens
cure would be worse than the disease.""23 Here, in case there was any remaining
doubt, the Court plainly invoked the property rights context in which the case arose:
[A] Bivens action to redress retaliation against those who resist Governmental
impositions on their property rights would invite claims in every sphere of
legitimate governmental action affecting property interests, from negotiating tax
claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Administration
regulations. Exercising any governmental authority affecting the value or
enjoyment of property interests would fall within the Bivens regime.... 232
Thus, the concern that judicial resources might be expended on future property
rights litigation was a deciding factor in the rejection of Robbins's claim. This fact
alone should give pause to property owners about whether the federal courts will
provide meaningful review of future governmental injuries to property.
Moreover, several things are worth noting about the Court's line of thinking. As
an initial matter, the Court seemingly went out of its way to paint a parade of
horribles, which again implies the Court' s own disregard for protecting the property
rights presented by Robbins' s case. The other examples of potential property-based
claims mentioned by the Court (enforcing the Internal Revenue Code or OSHA
regulations) do not involve the same type of choice-based dilemma that is at issue
under the Takings Clause-that is, the choice between surrendering the
constitutional right to just compensation or enduring the harassment of government
officials. Therefore, it is unlikely that these situations would give rise to the same
sort of retaliation claim alleged by Robbins or previously recognized in the context
of other constitutional rights. Moreover, even in the takings context, it is helpful to
remember that "a plaintiff seeking a damages remedy under the Constitution must
first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been violated., 233 Thus, to
prevail on a claim of retaliation under the Takings Clause, a plaintiff would need
to show that the government's underlying action-the action prompting the
plaintiffs insistence on just compensation and the resistance of which motivated
the government's retaliatory conduct-actually would constitute a taking in the first
place. That showing, in turn, would require a demonstration that the government
was seeking a direct appropriation of some portion of the plaintiff s property (such
as the easement in Wilkie) or that the government had taken regulatory action that
was functionally equivalent to a direct appropriation.23 This suggests a much
smaller number of viable claims than is evoked by the majority's global reference
to all governmental action that might affect property.
231. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604.
232. See id.
233. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
234. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 537-39 (2005); see also Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the
Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 63,
86-106 (2008) (discussing Lingle's effect on regulatory takings analysis).
[Vol. 39
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Second, the Court fails to explain why recognizing a Bivens remedy for property-
based claims is more taxing on judicial resources than claims stemming from the
violation of other rights. As the dissent noted, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 already provides
a similar remedy against state officials, and the federal courts have yet to be
inundated with retaliation claims against those officials arising out of the assertion
of rights under the Takings Clause.235 In any event, whether taxing or not, one of the
functions of the federal judiciary is to safeguard those rights expressed in the
Constitution from encroachment by the political branches.2 36 As Madison famously
stated when introducing the Bill of Rights, "independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights [expressed];
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
Legislative or Executive.,,237 Early American courts held a similar view, and they
were more than willing to hold both legislative and executive officials accountable
for uncompensated actions against private property interests. The Wilkie majority
calls into question the extent to which modem federal courts will do likewise.
Finally, the Court's floodgates argument suggests far more than a mere concern
for judicial resources. Rather, it reveals a mindset about the relative worth of the
Takings Clause as compared to other constitutional provisions. As Justice Ginsburg
noted, the Court rejected a similar floodgates argument years before in Davis v.
Passman.238 There, the Court endorsed Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Bivens itself: "Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these
days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this
basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative importance of
classes of legally protected interests. 239 Inasmuch as the Court previously has
chosen to remedy certain constitutional violations through the Bivens framework,
but refused to do so in Wilkie, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Court
has expressed its own normative choice about which types of constitutional rights
are deserving of judicial intervention and which are not.2' The exercise of such a
choice to exclude property rights from protection finds little support either in the
235. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (Ginsburg, ., dissenting).
236. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) ("We have no hesitation in saying that the right of
these petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be
silent-expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself-is a federal right which, in the absence of appropriate
congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.").
237. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
238. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248
(1979)). In Davis, the Court allowed a Bivens action on behalf of a congressional staffer alleging employment
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 248-49.
Although the Wilkie majority cited Davis, it failed to address that opinion's language about judicial resources. See
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597, 2600.
239. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 248 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
240. Although Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the majority opinion, they also concurred separately to
express their view that "Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to
create causes of action" and, for that reason, "Bivens and its progeny should be limited to the precise circumstances
that they involved." See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2608 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Unlike the rest of the majority, this approach would tend to treat property rights the same as all other
constitutional rights (except possibly the Fourth Amendment rights at issue in Bivens itself)-that is, as potentially
unprotected.
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constitutional text or in the distinctive role that courts historically played in
safeguarding property from governmental abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION
The contrast between the early American legal culture and the decision in Wilkie
reveals two very different approaches to constitutional property rights. As we have
seen, the early legal culture viewed private property as central to the proper
interaction between the state and its citizens, understood the just compensation
principle expressed in the Takings Clause to be an integral mechanism for
protecting private property from governmental encroachment, and saw the judiciary
as the barrier between the political branches and the property rights of the citizens
they represented. The majority opinion in Wilkie, by contrast, is at odds with each
of these characteristics, viewing the property rights embodied in the Takings Clause
as less deserving ofjudicial protection than other civil liberties. The picture painted
is one in which property rights have fallen from a "preferred position" to a "poor
relation."
This change is an important one inasmuch as it demonstrates that any constitu-
tional right is susceptible to relegation based on shifting judicial preferences. If a
right as central to early constitutional understanding as that of private property, not
to mention a principle as explicit in the constitutional text as that of just
compensation, can be demoted to second-class status, then other rights would
appear equally vulnerable.241 Moreover, the relationship between property rights
and other civil liberties should not be casually overlooked. The early legal culture
understood that the concepts of property and liberty are to some degree
interdependent. Although courts and commentators often speak of "property rights,"
the facts of Wilkie pointedly illustrate the Supreme Court's own admonition of just
a few decades ago:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel,
is in truth, a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare
check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence
exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.
Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized. 2
After Wilkie, that recognition is less clear.
241. See Somin, supra note 21 (noting that "most of the arguments for denying damage remedies for property
rights violations can also be used to justify their denial for violations of other individual rights").
242. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
[Vol. 39
